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Abstract
The goal of unsupervised image-to-image translation is to map images from one
domain to another without the ground truth correspondence between the two
domains. State-of-art methods learn the correspondence using large numbers of
unpaired examples from both domains and are based on generative adversarial
networks. In order to preserve the semantics of the input image, the adversarial
objective is usually combined with a cycle-consistency loss that penalizes incorrect
reconstruction of the input image from the translated one. However, if the target
mapping is many-to-one, e.g. aerial photos to maps, such a restriction forces the
generator to hide information in low-amplitude structured noise that is undetectable
by human eye or by the discriminator. In this paper, we show how such self-
attacking behavior of unsupervised translation methods affects their performance
and provide two defense techniques. We perform a quantitative evaluation of the
proposed techniques and show that making the translation model more robust to the
self-adversarial attack increases its generation quality and reconstruction reliability
and makes the model less sensitive to low-amplitude perturbations.
1 Introduction
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) [7] have enabled many recent breakthroughs in image
generation, such as being able to change visual attributes like hair color or gender in an impressively
realistic way, and even generate highly realistic-looking faces of people that do not exist [13, 31, 14].
Conditional GANs designed for unsupervised image-to-image translation can map images from one
domain to another without pairwise correspondence and ground truth labels, and are widely used for
solving such tasks as semantic segmentation, colorization, style transfer, and quality enhancement of
images [34, 10, 19, 3, 11, 35, 4] and videos [2, 1]. These models learn the cross-domain mapping
by ensuring that the translated image both looks like a true representative of the target domain, and
also preserves the semantics of the input image, e.g. the shape and position of objects, overall layout
etc. Semantic preservation is usually achieved by enforcing cycle-consistency [34], i.e. a small error
between the source image and its reverse reconstruction from the translated target image.
Despite the success of cycle-consistent GANs, they have a major flaw. The reconstruction loss forces
the generator network to hide the information necessary to faithfully reconstruct the input image
inside tiny perturbations of the translated image [5]. The problem is particularly acute in many-to-one
mappings, such as photos to semantic labels, where the model must reconstruct textures and colors
lost during translation to the target domain. For example, Figure 1’s top row shows that even when
the car is mapped incorrectly to semantic labels of building (gray) and tree (green), CycleGAN is still
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Figure 1: Results of translation of GTA [26] frames to semantic segmentation maps using CycleGAN, UNIT
and CycleGAN with our two proposed defense methods, additive noise and guess loss. The last column shows
the reconstruction of the input image when high-frequency noise (Gaussian noise with mean 0 and standard
deviation 0.08 ∼ 10 intensity levels out of 256) is added to the output map. Both of the proposed self-adversarial
defense techniques (Section 4) make the CycleGAN model more robust to the random noise and make it rely
more on the translation result rather than the adversarial structured noise as in the original CycleGAN and UNIT.
More translation examples can be found in the Section 3 of supplementary material. Best viewed in color.
able to “cheat” and perfectly reconstruct the original car from hidden information. It also reconstructs
road textures lost in the semantic map. This behavior is essentially an adversarial attack that the
model is performing on itself, so we call it a self-adversarial attack.
In this paper, we extend the analysis of self-adversarial attacks provided in [5] and show that the
problem is present in recent state-of-art methods that incorporate cycle consistency. We provide two
defense mechanisms against the attack that resemble the adversarial training technique widely used
to increase robustness of deep neural networks to adversarial attacks [9, 16, 32]. We also introduce
quantitative evaluation metrics for translation quality and reconstruction “honesty” that help to detect
self-adversarial attacks and provide a better understanding of the learned cross-domain mapping. We
show that due to the presence of hidden embeddings, state of the art translation methods are highly
sensitive to high-frequency perturbations as illustrated in Figure 1. In contrast, our defense methods
substantially decrease the amount of self-adversarial structured noise and thus make the mapping
more reliant on the input image, which results in more interpretable translation and reconstruction
and increased translation quality. Importantly, robustifying the model against the self-adversarial
attack makes it also less susceptible to the high-frequency perturbations which make it less likely to
converge to a non-optimal solution.
2 Related Work
Unsupervised image-to-image translation is one of the tasks of domain adaptation that received a
lot of attention in recent years. Current state-of-art methods [34, 20, 11, 15, 4, 10] solve this task
using generative adversarial networks [8] that usually consist of a pair of generator and discriminator
networks that are trained in a min-max fashion to generate realistic images from the target domain
and correctly classify real and fake images respectively.
The goal of image-to-image translation methods is to map the image from one domain to another in
such way that the output image both looks like a real representative of the target domain and contains
the semantics of the input image. In the supervised setting, the semantic consistency is enforced by
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the ground truth labels or pairwise correspondence. In case when there is no supervision, however,
there is no such ground truth guidance, so using regular GAN results in often realistic-looking
but unreliable translations. In order to overcome this problem, current state-of-art unsupervised
translation methods incorporate cycle-consistency loss first introduced in [34] that forces the model
to learn such mapping from which it is possible to reconstruct the input image.
Recently, various methods have been developed for unimodal (CycleGAN [34], UNIT [20], CoGAN
[21] etc.) and multimodal (MUNIT [11], StarGAN [4], BicycleGAN [35]) image-to-image translation.
In this paper, we explore the problem of self-adversarial attacks in three of them: CycleGAN,
UNIT and MUNIT. CycleGAN is a unimodal translation method that consists of two domain
discriminators and two generator networks; the generators are trained to produce realistic images
from the corresponding domains, while the discriminators aim to distinguish in-domain real images
from the generated ones. The generator-discriminator pairs are trained in a min-max fashion both to
produce realistic images and to satisfy the cycle-consistency property. The main idea behind UNIT is
that both domains share some common semantics, and thus can be encoded to the shared latent space.
It consists of two encoder-decoder pairs that map images to the latent space and back; the cross-
domain translation is then performed by encoding the image from the source domain to the latent
space and decoding it with the decoder for the target domain. MUNIT is a multimodal extension of
UNIT that performs disentanglement of domain-specific (style space) and domain-agnostic (content
space) features. While the original MUNIT does not use the explicit cycle-consistency loss, we
found that cycle-consistency penalty significantly increases the quality of translation and helps the
model to learn more reliable content disentanglement (see Figure 2). Thus, we used the MUNIT with
cycle-consistency loss in our experiments.
As illustrated in Figure 2, adding cycle-consistency loss indeed helps to disentangle domain-agnostic
information and enhance the translation quality and reliability. However, such pixelwise penalty was
shown [5] to force the generator to hide the domain-specific information that cannot be explicitly
reconstructed from the translated image (i.e., shadows or color of the buildings from maps in maps-
to-photos example) in such way that it cannot be detected by the discriminator.
It has been known that deep neural networks [17], while providing higher accuracy in the majority of
machine learning problems, are highly susceptible to the adversarial attacks [24, 29, 16, 23]. There
exist multiple defense techniques that make neural networks more robust to the adversarial examples,
such as adding adversarial examples to the training set or adversarial training [24, 22], distillation
[25], ensemble adversarial training [30], denoising [18] and many more. Moreover, [33] have shown
that defending the discriminator in a GAN setting increases the generation quality and prevents the
model from converging to a non-optimal solution. However, most adversarial defense techniques are
developed for the classification task and are very hard to adapt to the generative setting.
3 Self-Adversarial Attack in Cyclic Models
Suppose we are given a number of samples from two image domains x ∼ pA and y ∼ pB . The goal
is to learn two mappings G : x ∼ pA → y ∼ pB and F : y ∼ pB → x ∼ pA. In order to learn the
distributions pA and pB , two discriminators DA and DB are trained to classify whether the input
image is a true representative of the corresponding domain or generated by G or F accordingly. The
cross-distribution mapping is learned using the cycle-consistency property in form of a loss based on
the pixelwise distance between the input image and its reconstruction. Usually, the cycle-consistency
loss can be described as following:
Lrec = ‖F (G(x))− x‖1 (1)
However, in case when domain A is richer than B, the mapping G : x ∼ pA → y ∼ pB is many-to-
one (i.e. if for one image x ∼ pB there are multiple correct correspondences y ∼ pA), the generator
is still forced to perfectly reconstruct the input even though some of the information of the input
image is lost after the translation to the domain B. As shown in [5], such behavior of a CycleGAN
can be described as an adversarial attack, and in fact, for any given image it is possible to generate
such structured noise that would lead to reconstruction of the target image [5].
In practice, CycleGAN and other methods that utilize cycle-consistency loss add a very low-amplitude
signal to the translation yˆ that is invisible for a human eye. Addition of a certain signal is enough
to reconstruct the information of image x that should not be present in yˆ. This makes methods that
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incorporate cycle-consistency loss sensitive to low-amplitude high-frequency noise since that noise
can destroy the hidden signal (shown in Figure 3). In addition, such behavior can force the model
to converge to a non-optimal solution or even diverge since by adding structured noise the model
"cheats" to minimize the reconstruction loss instead of learning the correct mapping.
4 Defense techniques
4.1 Adversarial training with noise
One approach to defend the model from a self-adversarial attack is to train it to be resistant to the
perturbation of nature similar to the one produced by the hidden embedding. Unfortunately, it is
impoossible to separate the pure structured noise from the traslated image, so classic adversarial
defense training cannot be used in this scenario. However, it is possible to prevent the model from
learning to embed by adding perturbations to the translated image before reconstruction. The intuition
behind this approach is that adding random noise of amplitude similar to the hidden signal disturbs
the embedded message. This results in high reconstruction error, so the generator cannot rely on the
embedding. The modified noisy cycle-consistency loss can be described as follows:
Lnoisyrec = ‖F (G(x) + ∆(θn))− x‖1 , (2)
where ∆(θn) is some high-frequency perturbation function with parameters θn. In our experiments
we used low-amplitude Gaussian noise with mean equal to zero. Such a simplistic defense approach is
very similar to the one proposed in [33] where the discriminator is defended from the generator attack
by regularizing the discriminator objective using the adversarial vectors. In our setting, however, the
attack is targeted on both the discriminator and the generator of opposite domain, which makes it
harder to find the exact adversarial vector. Which is why we regularize both the discriminator and
generator using random noise. Since adding noise to the input image is equivalent to penalizing
large magnitude of the gradients of the loss function, this also forces the model to learn smoother
boundaries and prevents it from overfitting.
4.2 Guess Discriminator
Ideally, the self-adversarial attack should be detected by the discriminator, but this might be too
hard for it since it never sees real and fake examples of the same content. In the supervised
setting, this problem is naturally solved by conditioning the outputs on the ground truth labels. For
example, a self-adversarial attack does not occur in Conditional GANs because the discriminator
is conditioned on the ground truth class labels and is provided with real and fake examples of each
class. In the unsupervised setting, however, there is no such information about the class labels,
and the discriminator only receives unpaired real and fake examples from the domain. This task
is significantly harder for the discriminator as it has to learn the distribution of the whole domain.
One widely used defense strategy is adding the adversarial examples to the training set. While it is
possible to model the adversarial attack of the generator, it is very time and memory consuming as
it requires training an additional network that generates such examples at each step of training the
GAN. However, we can use the fact that cycle-consistency loss forces the model to minimize the
difference between the input and reconstructed images, so we can use the reconstruction output to
provide the fake example for the real input image as an approximation of the adversarial example.
Thus, the defense during training can be formulated in terms of an additional guess discriminator
that is very similar to the original GAN discriminator, but receives as input two images – input and
reconstruction – in a random order, and "guesses" which of the images is fake. As with the original
discriminator, the guess discriminator Dguess is trained to minimize its error while the generator
aims to produce such images that maximize it. The guess discriminator loss or guess loss can be
described as:
Lguess =
{
GAguess{X, F (G(X)}, with probability 0.5
1−GAguess{F (G(X)), X}, with probability 0.5
(3)
where X ∼ PA, GAguess(X, Xˆ) ∈ [0, 1]. This loss resembles the class label conditioning in the
Conditional GAN in the sense that the guess discriminator receives real and fake examples that are
presumably of the same content, therefore the embedding detection task is significantly simplified.
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Figure 2: Comparison of translation results produced by original MUNIT method and MUNIT with additional
cycle-consistency loss. In columns 2 and 3 are shown the translation results with two different randomly
generated style vectors. It can be observed that, while both methods incorrectly disentangled style and content
information, the method that contains cycle-consistency loss forces the model to preserve the overall scene
layout and produce more reliable translation in general. Column 5 shows the results of reconstruction of the
input image from the maps with the first random style (column 2). More examples on Google Maps translation
can be found in the supplementary material. Best viewed in color.
In addition to the defense approaches described above, it is beneficial to use the fact that the
relationship between the domains is one-to-many. One naive solution to add such prior knowledge
is by assigning a smaller weight to the reconstruction loss of the "richer" domain (e.g. photos
in maps-to-photos experiment). Results of our experiments show substantial improvement in the
generation quality when such a domain relation prior is used.
5 Experiments and results
In abundance of GAN-based methods for unsupervised image translation, we limited our analysis
to three popular state-of-art models that cover both unimodal and multimodal translation cases:
CycleGAN[34], UNIT[20] and MUNIT[11]. The details on model architectures and choice of
hyperparameters used in our experiments can be found in the supplementary materials.
5.1 Datasets
To provide empirical evidence of our claims, we performed a sequence of experiments on three
publicly available image-to-image translation datasets. Despite the fact that all three datasets are
paired and hence the ground truth correspondence is known, the models that we used are not capable
of using the ground-truth alignment by design and thus were trained in an unsupervised manner.
Google Aerial Photo to Maps dataset consisting of 3292 pairs of aerial photos and corresponding
maps. In our experiments, we resized the images from 600 × 600 pixels to 400 × 400 pixels for
MUNIT and UNIT and to 289×289 pixels for CycleGAN. During training, the images were randomly
cropped to 360× 360 for UNIT and MUNIT and 256× 256 for CycleGAN. The dataset is available
at [6]. We used 1098 images for training and 1096 images for testing.
Playing for Data (GTA)[26] dataset that consists of 24966 pairs of image frames and their semantic
segmentation maps. We used a subset of 10000 frames (7500 images for training, 2500 images for
testing) with day-time lighting resized to 192× 192 pixels, and randomly cropped with window size
128× 128.
SynAction [28] synthetic human action dataset consisting of a set of 20 possible actions performed
by 10 different human renders. For our experiments, we used two actors and all existing actions to
perform the translation from one actor to another; all other conditions such as background, lighting,
viewpoint etc. are chosen to be the same for both domains. We used this dataset to test whether
the self-adversarial attack is present in the one-to-one setting. The original images were resized to
512× 512 and cropped to 452× 452. We split the data to 1561 images in each domain for training
357 images for testing.
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Figure 4: Illustration of sensitivity (Eq. 5) of cycle-consistent translation methods to high-frequency
perturbations in one-to-many (left) and in many-to-one (right) cases. Here the domains A and B are
segmentation maps and GTA video frames respectively.
5.2 Metrics
Translation quality. The choice of aligned datasets was dictated by the need to quantita-
tively evaluate the translation quality which is impossible when the ground truth correspon-
dence is unknown. However, even having the ground truth pairs does not solve the issue of
quality evaluation in one-to-many case, since for one input image there exist a large (possi-
bly infinite) number of correct translations, so pixelwise comparison of the ground truth im-
age and the output of the model does not provide a correct metric for the translation quality.
Figure 3: Actor translation example with Cycle-
GAN, CycleGAN with noise and CycleGAN with
guess loss.
In order to overcome this issue, we adopted the
idea behind the Inception Score [27] and trained
the supervised Pix2pix[12] model to perform
many-to-one mapping as an intermediate step in
the evaluation. Considering the GTA dataset ex-
ample, in order to evaluate the unsupervised map-
ping from segmentation maps to real frames (later
on – segmentation to real), we train the Pix2pix
model to translate from real to segmentation;
then we feed it the output of the unsupervised
model to perform "honest" reconstruction of the
input segmentation map, and compute the Inter-
section over Union (IoU) and mean class-wise
accuracy of the output of Pix2Pix when given a
ground truth example and the output of the one-
to-many translation model. For any ground truth
pair (Ai, Bi), the one-to-many translation qual-
ity is computed as IoU(pix(GA(Bi)), pix(Ai)),
where pix(·) is the translation with Pix2pix
from A to B. The "honest reconstruction" is
compared with the Pix2pix translation of the
ground truth image Ai instead of the ground
truth image itself in order to take into account
the error produced by the Pix2pix translation.
Reconstruction honesty. Since it is impossible
to acquire the structured noise produced as a re-
sult of a self-adversarial attack, there is no direct
way to either detect the attack or measure the
amount of information hidden in the embedding.
Method MSE↓ SN ↓
CycleGAN 32.547 6.5 ± 2.2
CycleGAN+noise* 22.182 1.1 ± 0.1
CycleGAN+guess* 23.565 2.4 ± 0.2
Table 1: Results on SynAction dataset: mean
square error of the translation and sensitivity to
noise.
In order to evaluate the presence of a self-
adversarial attack, we developed a metric that we
call quantized reconstruction honesty. The intu-
ition behind this metric is that, ideally, the recon-
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Figure 5: Quantized reconstruction results of the original CycleGAN, CycleGAN with noise defense and
CycleGAN with guess loss defense. After translating the input GTA frame to the semantic translation map,
we performed quantization such that the resulting translation would only contain the colors present in the real
segmentation maps. We then fed the quantized translation results to reconstruct the input image (column 5). The
last column represents the translation from the corresponding ground truth semantic segmentation map to real
frame for comparison. Comparison with the non-quantized reconstruction reveals the degree of embedding of
the many-to-one mapping. For example, CycleGAN with the guess loss relies more on the input segmentation
map than the original CycleGAN, although it still tends to embed the information about the road marking. More
quantized translation examples can be found in the supplementary material. Best viewed in color.
struction error of the image of the richer domain should be the same as the one-to-many translation
error if given the same input image from the poorer domain. In order to measure whether the model
is independent of the origin of the input image, we quantize the many-to-one translation results in
such way that it only contains the colors from the domain-specific palette. In our experiments, we
approximate the quantized maps by replacing the colors of each pixel by the closest one from the
palette. We then feed those quantized images to the model to acquire the "honest" reconstruction
error, and compare it with the reconstruction error without quantization. The honesty metric for a
one-to-many reconstruction can be described as follows:
RH =
1
N
N∑
i=1
{‖GA(bGB(Xi)c)− Yi‖ − ‖GA(GB(Xi))− Yi‖}, (4)
where b∗c is a quantization operation, GB is a many-to-one mapping, (Xi, Yi) is a ground truth pair
of examples from domains A and B.
Sensitivity to noise. Aside from the obvious consequences of the self-adversarial attack, such as
convergence of the generator to a suboptimal solution, there is one more significant side effect of
it – extreme sensitivity to perturbations. Figure 1 shows how addition of low-amplitude Gaussian
noise effectively destroys the hidden embedding thus making a model that uses cycle-consistency
loss unable to correctly reconstruct the input image. In order to estimate the sensitivity of the model,
we add zero-mean Gaussian noise to the translation result before reconstruction and compute the
reconstruction error. The sensitivity to noise of amplitude σ for a set of images Xi ∼ pA is computed
by the following formula:
SN(σ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
MSE(GA(GB(Xi) +N (0, σ))−GA(GB(Xi))), (5)
where MSE is the mean square pixelwise error. The overall sensitivity of a method is then computed
as an area under curve of AuC(SN(σ)) ≈ ∫ b
a
SN(x)dx. In our experiments we chose a = 0,
b = 0.2, N = 500 for Google Maps and GTA experiments and N = 100 for the SynAction
experiment. In case when there is no structured noise in the translation, the reconstruction error
7
Method acc. segm ↑ IoU segm↑ IoU p2p↑ RH↓ SN↓
CycleGAN 0.226 0.157 0.203 27.434 ± 6.138 446.924
CycleGAN + noise* 0.240 0.167 0.230 9.166 ± 7.366 94.150
CycleGAN + guess* 0.237 0.169 0.208 11.380 ± 7.026 212.589
UNIT 0.075 0.044 0.063 6.373 ± 11.685 361.521
MUNIT + cycle 0.126 0.084 0.173 2.498 ± 8.859 244.950
pix2pix (supervised) 0.404 0.337 – – –
Table 2: Results on the GTA V dataset. acc. segm and IoU segm represent mean class-wise
segmentation accuracy and IoU, IoU p2p is the mean IoU of the pix2pix segmentation of the
segmentation-to-frame mappeing; RH (Eq.4) and SN(Eq.5) are the quantized reconstruction honesty
and sensitivity to noise of the many-to-one mapping (B2A2B) respectively. * – our proposed defense
methods. The reconstruction error distributions plots can be found in the supplementary material
(Section 2).
Method acc. segm↑ IoU segm↑ IoU p2p↑ RH ↓ SN↓
CycleGAN 0.233 0.175 0.210 21.775 ± 5.164 251.192
CycleGAN + noise* 0.242 0.187 0.218 12.266 ± 4.415 222.176
CycleGAN + guess* 0.241 0.184 0.224 7.467 ± 2.381 235.432
UNIT 0.212 0.153 0.124 19.631 ± 6.070 528.223
MUNIT + cycle 0.153 0.094 0.124 21.425 ± 7.855 687.276
pix2pix (supervised) 0.301 0.234 – – –
Table 3: Results on the Google Maps dataset. The notation is same as in the Table 2.
should be proportional to the amplitude of added noise, which is what we observe for the one-to-many
mapping using MUNIT and CycleGAN. Surprisingly, UNIT translation is highly senstive to noise
even in one-to-many case. The many-to-one mapping result (Figure 3), in contrast, suggests that the
structured noise is present, since the reconstruction error increases rapidly and quickly saturates at
noise amplitude 0.08. The results of one-to-many and many-to-one noisy reconstruction show that
both noisy CycleGAN and guess loss defense approaches make the CycleGAN model more robust to
high-frequency perturbations compared to the original CycleGAN.
5.3 Results.
The results of our experiments show that the problem of self-adversarial attacks is present in all three
cycle-consistent methods we examined. Surprisingly, the results on the SynAction dataset had shown
that self-adversarial attack appear even if the learned mapping is one-to-one (Table 1). Both defense
techniques proposed in Section 4 make CycleGAN more robust to random noise and increase its
translation quality (see Tables 1, 2 and 3). The noise-regularization defense helps the CycleGAN
model to become more robust both to small perturbations and to the self-adversarial attack. The
guess loss approach, on the other hand, while allowing the model to hide some small portion of
information about the input image (for example, road marking for the GTA experiment), produces
more interpretable and reliable reconstructions. Since both defense techniques force the generators to
rely more on the input image than on the structured noise, their results are more interpretable and
provide deeper understanding of the methods "reasoning". For example, since the training set did
not contain any examples of a truck that is colored in white and green, at test time the guess-loss
CycleGAN approximated the green part of the truck with the "vegetation" class color and the white
part with the building class color (see Section 3 of the supplementary material); the reconstructed
frame looked like a rough approximation of the truck despite the fact that the semantic segmentation
map was wrong. This can give a hint about the limitations of the given training set.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced the self-adversarial attack phenomenon of unsupervised image-to-image
translation methods – the hidden embedding performed by the model itself in order to reconstruct
the input image with high precision. We empirically showed that self-adversarial attack appears in
models when the cycle-consistency property is enforced and the target mapping is many-to-one. We
provided the evaluation metrics that help to indicate the presence of self-adversarial attack, and a
translation quality metric for one-to-many mappings. We also developed two adversarial defense
techniques that significantly reduce the hidden embedding and force the model to produce more
"honest" results, which, in return, increases its translation quality.
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7 Model description and parameters
In our experiments, we used the implementation of CycleGAN provided at https://github.com/
junyanz/pytorch-CycleGAN-and-pix2pix. For all CycleGAN models we used (original, noisy
and guess-loss based) we set all the CycleGAN parameters to the default ones provided in the
implementation except for the weights of the cycle-consistency loss.
The CycleGAN parameters used in our experiments are:
• Generator architecture – ResNet with 9 residual block layers
• Discriminator architecture – 3-layer PatchGAN with patch size 70x70 .
• Weight initialization – gaussian
• Instance normalization
• GAN objective – LSGAN
• Optimizer – Adam with momentum 0.5
• Learning rate – 0.0002 with linear policy
• Trained for 200 epochs.
The parameters specific to the proposed defense techniques are:
• For training with additive noise: standard deviation of noise σ that should lie in the interval
[0, 1]. The higher is the value of σ, the harder it is for the model to perform the self-
adversarial attack. We chose the minimal value which results in the reconstruction that lacks
the high-frequency details that should be lost after the translation, such as road texture or
color.
• For the guess loss – weight of the guess loss λguess. We chose λguess and the cycle-
consistency losses weights λA and λB such that their corresponding loss values are of the
similar magnitude during training. In other words, we choose the loss weights to be such
that they all lie within one range and none of them dominates in the overall loss.
For the GTA dataset, the defense-specific parameters are:
• CycleGAN: λA = 10, λB = 10. We performed the experiments with on the CycleGAN
with the smaller weights λA and λB that are proportional to the cross-domain relation as
for the guess loss approach (e.g. λA = 5 and λB = 3), and this resulted in unreliable
translation.
• CycleGAN + noise: σ = 0.06, λA = 5, λB = 3.
• CycleGAN + guess loss: λguess = 2, λA = 1.5, λB = 1.
For the SynAction, the defense-specific parameters are:
• CycleGAN: λA = 10, λB = 10.
• CycleGAN + noise: σ = 0.1, λA = 10, λB = 10.
• CycleGAN + guess loss: λguess = 1, λA = 2, λB = 2.
For the Google Maps dataset, we used the following parameters:
• CycleGAN: λA = 10, λB = 10.
• CycleGAN + noise: σ = 0.06, λA = 10, λB = 10.
• CycleGAN + guess loss: λguess = 1, λA = 1, λB = 2.
We based our experiments on the UNIT and MUNIT models on their original implementation:
https://github.com/NVlabs/MUNIT.
UNIT architecture and parameters are:
• Optimizer – Adam with momentum 0.5 and second momentum 0.999
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• Initialization – Kaiming
• Learning rate – 0.0001 with step decay policy (decay weight 0.5, step size 10000 iterations)
• weight on image reconstruction loss – 10
• weight on cycle-consistency loss – 10
• – weight of KL loss for cycle consistency – 0.01.
• Discriminator – 4-layer multiscale LSGAN with leaky ReLU activation function and 3
scales.
• Generator – VAE with ReLU activations, with 64 filters in the first layer, 2 downsampling
layers and 4 residual blocks for the content encoder and decoder.
• Padding – reflect.
MUNIT parameters are:
• Optimizer – Adam with momentum 0.5 and second momentum 0.999
• Initialization – Kaiming
• Learning rate – 0.0001 with step decay policy (decay weight 0.5, step size 10000 iterations)
• weight on image reconstruction loss – 10
• weight on explicit cycle-consistency loss – 1
• – weight of KL loss for cycle consistency – 0.01.
• Discriminator – 4-layer multiscale LSGAN with leaky ReLU activation function and 3
scales.
• Generator – VAE with ReLU activations, with 64 filters in the first layer, with 256 filters in
MLP, 2 downsampling layers and 4 residual blocks for the content encoder and decoder.
• Padding – reflect.
• Length of style code – 8
The code for the guess loss CycleGAN and noisy CycleGAN can be found in files "cy-
cle_gan_guess_model.py" and "cycle_gan_noisy.py" respectively. In order to train or test the
model, please add them to the folder "models" of the original CycleGAN project (https://
github.com/junyanz/pytorch-CycleGAN-and-pix2pix) and specify the model parameter as
"cycle_gan_guess" or "cycle_gan_noisy" instead of "cycle_gan".
8 Statistics
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Figure 6: GTA.Left: Difference in the error distribution of the non-quantized vs quantized recon-
structions, right: Reconstruction Honesty distributions.
Figure 7: Google Maps. Left: Difference in the error distribution of the non-quantized vs quantized
reconstructions, right: Reconstruction Honesty distributions.
9 Translation Results Figures.
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Figure 8: Sensitivity to noise on the Google Maps dataset. Left: translation from map to photo to
map, right: translation from photo to map to photos.
Figure 9: Sensitivity to noise on the SynAction dataset. Left: translation from actor A to actor B,
right: translation from actor B to actor A.
Figure 10: Results of translation of GTA frames to semantic segmentation maps.
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Figure 11: Example of translation and reconstruction with CycleGAN + guess loss.
Figure 12: Noisy reconstruction.
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Figure 13: Truck translation and reconstruction example with CycleGAN + guess loss.
Figure 14: Noisy reconstruction.
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Figure 15: Quantized reconstruction of CycleGAN, UNIT and MUNIT.
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Figure 16: Quantized reconstruction of CycleGAN, CycleGAN + noise and CycleGAN + guess loss.
Figure 17: Translation result with the proposed defense techniques.
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Figure 18: Noisy reconstruction result.
Figure 19: Noisy reconstruction.
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Figure 20: Results of translation of SynAction actors.
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